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Since 1991 the Italian Legislator grants amnesties, protection and even economic bene.ts to former mobsters cooperating 
with the justice. These incentives were intro- duced to break down omertà. What is the economic logic behind this policy? Did 
the program succeed? To address these issues we develop a model accounting for the main trade-o¤s involved in the 
introduction of accomplice-witnesses regulations. We argue that rewarding informants is sometimes necessary to .ght 
organized crime and show how the optimal amnesty varies with the e¤ectiveness of the protection program, the reliability of 
the informants.testimonies, the strength of external complicities, and the internal cohesion between criminal partners. The 
optimal policy sti.es crime, spurs prosecution and induce a negative relationship between the number of talkers and the 
conviction rate. The available evidence supports the model.s predictions. 
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Since the pioneering work by Becker (1968), organized crime has attracted considerable at-
tention by economists, and for good reasons. The di⁄usion of organized crime has forced
governments to reform their legal and judicial systems in an attempt to enhance the e⁄ec-
tiveness of investigation agencies and strengthen deterrence. These reforms have promoted
the approval of special laws changing the rules according to which sanctions and imprison-
ment policies are settled. Among them those introducing ￿ accomplice-witnesses regulations￿
(also known as leniency programs), which are designed to encourage former mobsters to
cooperate with prosecutors in exchange of reduced sanctions and sometimes even economic
incentives, are perhaps the most relevant.
Our paper has two main goals. First, in order to shed new light on the determinants
of accomplice-witnesses regulations, we develop a model with hierarchical criminal organi-
zations and dishonest o¢ cials where, to break down omert￿, the Legislator grants lenient
punishments to those criminals who decide to cooperate with the justice. Second, by using
data collected for Italy, we wish to provide evidence supporting our theoretical predictions.
We argue that the Italian accomplice-witnesses program introduced in 1991 has been a rel-
evant tool for ￿ghting ma￿a associations in those Italian provinces where they have been
historically more pervasive: we identify the positive e⁄ect of the policy on prosecution and
show that it also strengthened deterrence. Moreover, we also provide evidence that the
e¢ ciency of the judicial system a⁄ects in a non-negligible way the incentive to become an
informant.
The game involves a Legislator, a criminal organization and a continuum of public
o¢ cials. The Legislator must decide whether to introduce a leniency program and, in case
it does so, chooses the amnesty granted to talkers. The criminal organization is formed by
two mobsters: a principal (boss) and an agent (picciotto), each with speci￿c skills. The boss
￿the ￿ mind￿ ￿plans the crime and delegates its execution to the agent ￿the ￿ arm￿of the
organization. After the crime is committed and an investigation starts, the agent decides
whether to face the trial or to cooperate with the justice by providing information which
will be used by prosecutors to convict the boss.1 The prize for such a cooperation is the
amnesty announced by the Legislator at the outset of the game. Finally, in order to model
the extent of external complicities between criminal organizations and public o¢ cials, we
also assume that there exists a fraction of dishonest o¢ cials in the economy who always
1For instance, in 1992, former Camorra accomplice Pasquale Galasso revealed information crucial for the
arrest of his boss Carmine Al￿eri.
￿2 ￿acquit criminals ended up under investigation.
We point out that granting amnesty to former criminals willing to cooperate with the
justice has two countervailing e⁄ects on the crime rate. On the one hand, it encourages entry
into the illegal business by lowering the agent￿ s expected sanction and thus the compensation
that the boss has to pay to hire the agent ￿this brings out the dark side of leniency programs.
On the other hand, rewarding ￿ ipping criminals with lower sanctions exacerbates con￿ icts
within criminal organizations: a more generous amnesty program may induce criminals
under investigation to cooperate more often, whereby increasing the prosecution risk faced
by their boss ￿this is the bright side of leniency programs.
The analysis shows that the optimal policy sti￿ es the crime rate, spurs prosecution rela-
tive to the ￿ status quo￿where cooperation is not rewarded, and induce a negative relationship
between the number of talkers and the conviction rate. We also identify the determinants
of the optimal amnesty rate granted to informants and show that more generous amnesties
or even rewards are necessary to ￿ght organized crime when the judicial system is not very
e⁄ective, criminal organizations feature low cohesion between their members, the informa-
tion provided by accomplice-witnesses has a valuable investigative content and there exist
strong external complicities between public o¢ cials and criminal organizations.
The available historical evidence o⁄ers ample support to this comparative statics. For
instance, our model predicts that rewards are needed when the criminal organization ex-
hibits excessively strong internal cohesion. This insight might explain why very few accom-
plices belong to the Calabrian ￿ Ndrangheta, whose members are mainly linked by blood
relationships. Di⁄erently, the case of the ￿rst important pentito Tommaso Buscetta, who
was allowed to live in the USA under a new identity after his testimony in the ￿ New York
Pizza Connection Trial￿in the mid-1980s, underlines the relevant role played by the infor-
mative content of testimonies in determining the amnesties granted to former accomplices.
The importance of this link was recognized by the Italian Parliament who reformed the
accomplice-witnesses program in February 2001. The new law strengthened the criteria
for eligibility in the program and tailored the amnesty to the relevance of the testimony
provided by the informant.2 Finally, the need for more generous amnesties in environments
where criminal organizations have strong external complicities, is well exempli￿ed by the
long abscondence of the dangerous corleonesi heads Tot￿ Riina and Bernardo Provenzano,
whose early capture was prevented by the complicity of Bruno Contrada, a former head
of the SISDE (the Italian Intelligence Agency), who was accused of informing the Sicilian
ma￿a on upcoming police operations.
2This reform introduced a preliminary period of six months during which the accomplice must reveal all
the information he is aware of. It is only after this period, and upon an evaluation of the reliability of the
testimony, that he can be admitted into program.
￿3 ￿To support our theoretical predictions, we exploit a unique panel data set, relative to
95 Italian provinces and 26 judicial districts, providing information not only about many
important aspects of organized crime in Italy, but also on some relevant features of the
Italian leniency and accomplice-protection program. We use these data to document the
positive correlation between the introduction of the Italian leniency program and the number
of ma￿a related crimes prosecuted, the negative correlation between the introduction of the
program and the crime rate, and the positive correlation between the in￿ ow of accomplices
into the program and an e¢ ciency proxy of the Italian judicial system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of organized
crime and accomplice-witnesses regulation in Italy, in addition to some preliminary and
motivating evidence about the deterrence e⁄ect produced by the Italian leniency program on
ma￿a crimes. Section 3 sets up the theoretical model and develops the main characterization
results along with the comparative statics. Section 4 presents some more elaborated evidence
about the model￿ s main predictions. Section 5 relates our work to the earlier literature.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Italian experience: historical and motivating evidence
Italy o⁄ers a shining example of the revolutionary role played by accomplice witnesses in
the ￿ght against organized crime. In this section we report some anecdotal evidence about
Italian criminal organizations and their history which motivate the theoretical approach
taken in Section 5.
2.1 Criminal organizations and leniency in Italy
Criminal organizations have historically characterized some areas of Italy. In 1982, the
Italian Legislator recognized the pervasive role of ￿ ma￿a-type criminal associations￿through
the article 416-bis of the Penal Code: as stated by its third clause, the typical methodology
of the ma￿a association is ￿the exploitation of the force of intimidation of the associative
tie and of the condition of subjugation and silence (omert￿) which derives from it￿ . Since
then, people may be prosecuted because of being members of ma￿a families.3
From 1982 to 2001, the new o⁄ence determined the convictions of 5,443 Italian citizens.
3A number of common crime o⁄ences constitutes the illicit activity of a criminal association (for instance,
illicit tra¢ c of drugs, loan sharking, murder, and extortion). However, the crime o⁄ence designated as ma￿a
association refers to the possibility to induce fear in one￿ s behavior through the force of intimidation of the
entire organization. Thus, a common crime o⁄ence like the extortion is considered in a di⁄erent way in the
sentencing if it is committed using ma￿a intimidation. Moreover, also a licit goal may be prosecuted if it is
achieved through the force of subjugation.
￿4 ￿Data at regional level show that 5,069 individuals, that is more than 93% of the total
number of convicted mobsters, were sentenced by Courts having jurisdiction within 4 out
of the 20 Italian regions: Sicily and Campania are the regions with the highest number
of convictions, followed by Puglia and Calabria (Table 1). These regions are historically
troubled by di⁄erent ma￿a groups: the Camorra in Campania, the ￿ Ndrangheta in Calabria,
the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) in Puglia, and the Ma￿a in Sicily.4 Each group consists of
a number of ma￿a associations, the most ￿ famous￿being the Cosa Nostra in Sicily and,
recently, the Casalesi in Campania.
Table 1: Convictions for mafia affiliation
Number of people convicted
1982-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 1982-2001
Campania 970 332 420 1722 31.7%
Calabria 150 168 229 547 10.0%
Puglia 35 245 396 676 12.4%
Sicily 229 681 1214 2124 39.0%
Rest of Italy 61 202 111 374 6.9%
Total 1445 1628 2370 5443 100.0%
The strength of the Italian criminal organizations, as well as their increasing in￿ uence
on the legal economic activity, rest on a di⁄use external complicity, namely, the growing
relationships between various bosses and public o¢ cials such as national or local politicians,
judges, public local administrators and members of the police force (Dickey, 2004). In order
to break down omert￿ and weaken such external complicities, the Italian Legislator reacted
by setting harsher punishments for ma￿a a¢ liates and, at the same time, by granting full
or partial amnesty to those accomplices who provide information leading to further ma￿a
prosecutions or revealing external complicity, (D.L. 13/05/1991 n. 152). After an intense
political debate, in 1991 the Legislator also introduced the accomplice-witness protection
program, aimed at taking care of those who endanger themselves because of the information
provided to the judicial authority, (D.L. 15/01/1991 n. 8).5
Table 2 reports the 2008 distribution of former ma￿a accomplices who were taking
part in the protection program (they are grouped on the basis of the criminal association
4In the following we sometimes refer to those regions as core-regions.
5This program provides for the health, safety, and welfare of informants and their families; in some cases
it even grants rewards by securing minimum wages, housing and other ￿nancial needs. The ability of a
witness to give testimony in a judicial setting or to cooperate with prosecutors without fear of intimidation
or reprisal is essential to maintaining the rule of law. Police o¢ cers, prosecutors, and defence advocates tend
to agree that ￿ ￿ ipping￿criminals had often chosen to accept the penalties for not testifying rather than risk
serious injury.
￿5 ￿Table 2: Former Mafia Accomplices (Talkers) and Confiscation
Talker Con￿scation
2008 1992-2007
Camorra 294 35% 3,018 52%
￿ Ndrangheta 101 12% 308 5%
SCU 95 11% 190 3%
Sicilian Ma￿a 239 29% 1,878 32%
Others 104 13% 431 7%
Total 833 100% 5,826 100%
Note: Talker denotes the number of former ma￿a ac-
complices who were taking part the protection pro-
gram at the end of 2008. Con￿scation denotes the
value (million of euros) of total assets con￿scated.
they provided information about). On the whole, 729 out of 833 accomplices (i.e., 87% of
the total), provided relevant information on the four mostly known ma￿a associations; the
Sicilian ma￿a and the Camorra are each concerned by roughly one third of dissociates. The
relevance of the above criminal associations also comes out when considering the amounts
of illegal proceeds that were con￿scated. Table 2, second column, shows that 93% of total
proceeds con￿scated are related to Camorra, Sicilian ma￿a, ￿ Ndrangheta, and SCU. As for
the number of accomplices, the Camorra and the Sicilian ma￿a are those mostly concerned
by the e⁄ect of the con￿scation laws.
2.2 Buscetta meets Falcone: the roots of accomplice-witnesses
The ￿rst ma￿a member acknowledging the existence of ￿ Cosa Nostra￿was Joseph Valachi;
his testimony was key for the opening of the ￿rst important Italian ma￿a trial in 1967. In
the 1970s another two ma￿a fellows, Beppe Di Cristina and Leonardo Vitale, publicly talked
about the existence of a group of people from the town of Corleone ￿among which Vito
Ciancimino, Luciano Liggio, Bernardo Provenzano and Tot￿ Riina ￿leading illicit tra¢ cs in
Sicily. Yet, Tommaso Buscetta is widely recognized as the ￿rst important former criminal
breaking omert￿ in Italy. During the 1980s he helped the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo
Borsellino to achieve signi￿cant successes in the ￿ght against organized crime. He was the
key witness in the Maxi Trial that sent almost 350 Ma￿a members to prison. Buscetta
exposed the existence and workings of the ￿ Sicilian Ma￿a Commission￿ .6 His cooperation
enabled Falcone to argue that Cosa Nostra was a uni￿ed hierarchical structure ruled by
6The Commission is a body of leading Ma￿a members deciding on important questions concerning the
actions of, and settling disputes within the Sicilian Ma￿a.
￿6 ￿a Commission, and that its leaders could be held responsible for criminal activities that
were committed to bene￿t the organization. This premise became known as the ￿ Buscetta
theorem￿and was at the root of the Maxi Trial sentence in January 1992. His testimony
in the ￿ New York Pizza Connection Trial￿in the mid-1980s also allowed the conviction of
hundreds of mobsters in Italy and the United States. As a reward for his help, Buscetta
was allowed to live in the USA under a new identity in the Witness Protection Program.
Before the 1990￿ s, there were very few, albeit signi￿cant ￿ pentiti￿following Buscetta￿ s
example.7 However, this changed signi￿cantly during the early 1990￿ s, especially from 1991
on when, thanks to the intense activity of Falcone￿ s group, the Italian Legislator introduced
the accomplice-witnesses protection program. Since then, over a thousand ma￿osi have
agreed to collaborate with Italian justice not only in Sicily. For instance the information
provided by Camorra fellows such as Carmine Al￿eri, Domenico Bidognetti, Guglielmo
Giuliano and Carmine Schiavone, deeply supported the antima￿a activity in Campania.
A few ￿nal remarks are worthwhile about some intriguing features of the Italian ex-
perience. First, accomplices rarely decide to cooperate before being under investigation.
Second, strikingly enough, many among the most dangerous and in￿ uential ma￿a heads
never cooperated with the justice although being charged of several life sentences: Ra⁄aele
Cutolo, Luciano Liggio, Bernardo Provenzano, Tot￿ Riina and Francesco Schiavone, for
instance, repeatedly refused any type of collaboration with prosecutors to protect ￿they
claimed ￿their status of ￿ man of honor￿ . Finally, as a matter of fact, the program has poorly
performed in Calabria, where there are relatively few pentiti.8 This puzzle seems to rest on
the speci￿c organizational form of the ￿ Ndrangheta, which shows a greater cohesion between
its members relative to the other Italian criminal organizations. The principal di⁄erence
with the organization of Cosa Nostra or Camorra lies in the recruitment methods. The
￿ Ndrangheta recruits members on the criterion of blood relationships, which results in a
tight cohesion within the family clan that presents a major obstacle to investigation (Paoli,
2003).
2.3 Accomplice-witnesses and ma￿a trials
The ￿rst important Italian trial against the Sicilian Ma￿a opened in 1967 and concerned its
growing involvement in the heroin trade. The trial, based on the sparse evidence provided by
Joseph Valachi ended one year later with the acquittal of all defendants. In the same period,
7For instance, the collaboration of Francesco Mannoia was extremely important because he was the ￿rst
pentito from the winning family of the second ma￿a war. Salvatore Contorno also played a key role in the
Palermo Maxi Trial.
8At the end of 2008, there only were 95 former a¢ liates to the ￿ Ndrangheta in the protection program.
￿7 ￿judge Cesare Terranova sent to trial 114 defendants, with the view that the crimes and those
accused of carrying them out were all linked and should be treated as an organized body.
The defendants were accused of crimes relating to the ￿rst ma￿a war, the charges including
multiple murder, kidnapping, tobacco smuggling, theft, public massacre and organized crime
(see Gambetta, 1992). The trial lasted for a year and resulted in only ten convictions, several
of those were just for organized crime.
The third trial began in February 1969. There were sixty-four defendants, all from the
town of Corleone. The charges related to a ma￿a war in Corleone that started in 1958,
and resulted in over ￿fty murders. There was signi￿cant evidence tampering during the
trial, which experienced the ￿rst public intimidation act.9 All sixty-four defendants were
acquitted. Whilst there was undoubtedly witness intimidation and evidence tampering, a
lot of the evidence was fairly thin. There were no pentiti at the time and few non-Ma￿osi
willing to risk death by testifying for the prosecution.
During the early 1980s, the Corleonesi boss Tot￿ Riina decimated other Ma￿a families,
resulting in hundreds of murders, including several high-pro￿le authority ￿gures such as
Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa: a period known as the second ma￿a war. The growing public
revulsion at such killings provided the necessary premise to the ￿ Palermo Maxi Trial￿ , whose
preliminary phase was headed by judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Never
before so many Ma￿osi were on trial at the same time in Italy. A total of 474 defendants
were facing charges, which included 120 murders, drug tra¢ cking and extortion; the new
law made it moreover an o⁄ence to be a member of the Ma￿a. Most of the crucial evidence
came from Tommaso Buscetta and Salvatore Contorno. The trial ended on December 1987,
almost two years after its beginning. Of the 474 defendants 360 were convicted; 2,665 years
of prison sentences were shared out between the guilty, not including the life sentences
handed to the nineteen leading Ma￿a bosses and killers.
The major Italian trial against organized crime not involving Sicilian mobsters was the
￿ Spartacus Maxi Trial￿ , which was speci￿cally directed against the activities of the powerful
Casalesi clan of the Camorra and its boss Francesco Schiavone. The trial was opened on
July 1998 and continued until June 2008, when its ￿nal verdict was read. The 10-year legal
trial charged 36 members of the clan with a string of murders and other crimes. All were
found guilty and 16 sentenced to life imprisonment including the Casalesi bosses Francesco
9As the jury retired in July, they and the judge received an anonymous note that read: ￿To the President
of the Court of Assise, and members of the Jury: You have not understood, or rather, you don￿ t want
to understand, what Corleone means. You are judging honest gentlemen of Corleone, denounced through
caprice by the Carabinieri and Police. We simply want to warn you that if a single gentleman from Corleone
is convicted, you will be blown sky high, you will be wiped out, you will be butchered and so will every
member of your family. We think we￿ ve been clear. Nobody must be convicted. Otherwise you will be
condemned to death - you and your families. A Sicilian proverb says: ￿ A man warned is a man saved￿ . It￿ s
up to you. Be wise￿ .
￿8 ￿Schiavone and his chief lieutenant, Francesco Bidognetti. More than 500 witnesses and 25
informants testi￿ed in the trial which saw a total of 700 years of imprisonment with nearly
6 billions euros con￿scated to the defendants by the Italian Financial Police and Customs
Police (Anselmo and Braucci, 2008).
2.4 Motivating evidence
In order to motivate our theoretical analysis and show that it is important to develop a
model where leniency has a non trivial impact on the way criminal organizations perform,
it might be useful to have a look at some preliminary evidence about the deterrence e⁄ect
of the Italian accomplice-witnesses program on ma￿a related crimes.
Is it possible to show that the introduction of this program had a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on the evolution of ma￿a crimes? If so, how does this e⁄ect compare to the evolution of
non-ma￿a related crimes before and after 1991? Was this e⁄ect stable across the Italian
regions historically more troubled by ma￿a groups? We argue that the 1991 reform seems
to have produced an impact on ma￿a related crimes, while it did not have much in￿ uence
on non-ma￿a crimes.
Let us start with some important considerations about the main empirical issues at
stake. Since illegal acts do not typically take place in broad daylight, providing evidence of
the deterrence e⁄ect of new reforms is generally a di¢ cult task. More precisely, if the policy
a⁄ects negatively the crime population (deterrence) and positively the share of uncovered
crimes, identifying deterrence can be very hard, if not impossible, as long as only the number
of prosecuted crimes is observed. In principle, an highly successful policy, which would
completely deter crime, might be indistinguishable from an ine⁄ective policy whenever the
detection rate is small.10
In the case of criminal organizations data on murders allow to overcome this obstacle.
Di⁄erently from other crimes, almost all murders are uncovered: measured murders re￿ ect
the amount of e⁄ective ones.11 Figure 1 illustrates the number of ma￿a-related murders
reported by the police forces in Italy, MAFIA-MURDER.
The vertical bar marks the introduction of the leniency program in 1991. Strikingly
enough, after an increasing trend ended in 1991 with 719 ma￿a murders, which corre-
sponded to roughly 50% of all other malicious murders, a downward sloping path started
one year after the introduction of the Italian leniency program. In 2007 the number of
10A similar problem arises in the literature dealing with the empirical analysis of collusive agreements
among ￿rms (see, for instance, Harrington, 2006, and Miller, 2009).
11The dataset that we shall use includes all ma￿a related murders (i.e., the number of people killed for
ma￿a purposes), including those for which the executor is prosecuted and those for which it remains unknown.
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ma￿a murders in Italy decreased up to 119, that is roughly 20% of the rest of murders.
More importantly, the aggregate path is neither due to some composite e⁄ects, nor to a
speci￿c ma￿a association: A similar path characterizes provinces within the same region
and across the core-regions. As shown in Figure 1-bis, deterrence is detected within all the
4 provinces ￿ Naples, Reggio Calabria, Catania and Caserta ￿ with the largest numbers
of ma￿a murders in 1991-92.
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Campania: Caserta
￿10 ￿Do other crimes feature the same pattern? As a robustness check, we would like to
consider the evolution of non-ma￿a murders. Note that data used for the ￿gures above con-
stitute a lower bound of all murders perpetrated by ma￿a accomplices, and this is especially
true when we consider the core regions. Indeed, only those murders that are recognized with
certainty as furthering the goals of ma￿a associations are included in MAFIA-MURDER.
This is the reason why we consider non ma￿a murders for those regions where the number
of ma￿a murders are very rare. Moreover, we also look at the evolution of other non-ma￿a
crimes such as robberies in banks and post o¢ ces, and kidnappings whose ultimate purpose
is not extortion. Arguably, like for the case of murders, observed values of these crimes
re￿ ect to a large extent the corresponding population. But, it is well known that robberies
and kidnappings are usually unrelated to ma￿a associations.12 In those cases we should
thus not observe a drop after the 1991. Accordingly, Figure 1-ter shows that all variables
feature an increasing path during the 1990s.
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Although not conclusive, this evidence supports the idea that the introduction of the
Italian leniency program deterred ma￿a murders. Clearly, there might have been other
di⁄erent factors explaining the sharp drop of murders after 1991. But, the overall picture
does provide an encouraging preliminary step towards the development of a formal approach
to accomplice-witnesses regulation, and it certainly calls for further empirical exercises aimed
at testing the main predictions of such a model. The reminder of the paper will be devoted
to pursue these two tasks.
12We have excluded the kidnapping aimed at extortion because one cannot be sure that these crimes are
completely unrelated to ma￿as. Note indeed that Reggio Calabria, which is the Calabrian area featuring the
highest concentration of ￿ Ndrangheta clans , is one of the four provinces ￿ Torino, Reggio Calabria, Milano
and Roma ￿ with the largest numbers of kidnappings aimed at extortion. Incidentally, we have veri￿ed
that only in Reggio Calabria, among these four provinces, the number of kidnappings features a strong drop
after 1991.
￿11 ￿Let us conclude the section with some remarks about the variable ￿ number of murders￿￿
which we have used to proxy the crime rate ￿and its link with the volume of the organized
crime business ￿a variable that will pertain more closely to our model. To what extent the
number of ma￿a murders is positively correlated with the expansion of the organized crime
activity? In order to motivate our approach, we shall appeal to the historical evidence.
Many among the most important ma￿a wars originated by the raise of new opportunities
in illicit tra¢ cs.13 The second ma￿a war that decimated in the early 1980s several Sicilian
families, for instance, blew when the group lead by Luciano Liggio ￿the so called ￿ corleonesi￿
￿took over the new business opportunities originated by the expanding heroin trade and the
real estate boom around the city of Palermo. Similarly, during the late 1970s, in Campania,
the emerging group lead by Ra⁄aele Cutolo ￿from whom ￿ i cutoliani￿￿took over the illicit
tra¢ cs stemming from the huge increase in the unauthorized tobacco smuggling and the
new business opportunities in the reconstruction sector that emerged after the devastating
earthquake in 1980. Cutolo and his fellows decimated most of the older Camorra clans,
which reorganized in the early 1980s to ￿ght back and start one of the bloodiest ma￿a wars
in Italy. More recently, in late 1990s the expansion of the narcotic trade was again at the
root of a wide and bloody con￿ ict in Campania ￿the so called ￿ Faida di Scampia￿￿that
took place between several camorra families located in the neighborhood of Scampia, the
largest narcotic ￿ market￿in Naples.
3 The model
Drawing on the historical evidence reported above, in this section we derive a formal model
to describe in the simplest possible way the main trade-o⁄s generated by the introduction
of the leniency program.
Players and environment: The game involves a benevolent Legislator, a criminal organi-
zation and a continuum of public o¢ cials. The Legislator, having forbidden welfare reducing
criminal acts, designs an accomplice-witnesses program. The criminal organization is formed
by two mobsters: a boss and a fellow.14 The boss (the mind of the organization) plans the
crime and delegates it to the agent (the arm) who materially commits the illegal act.15
13See, among others, Lodato (2006) and Cantone (2008) for evidence relative to, respectively, the Ma￿a
and the Camorra.
14We focus on this two-people structure only for tractability reasons. All our insights would carry on in a
more complex framework where the boss leads more than one agent.
15These are the bottom of the chain of command: the picciotti d￿ onore or soldiers, who are expected to
perform tasks with blind obedience until they are promoted to the next level, where they will be granted
command over their own group of soldiers.
￿12 ￿Public o¢ cials manage the prosecution of criminals infringing the law.16
The crime yields a revenue R which is stochastic and distributed over the compact
support [0;R] according to the cumulative distribution function F (R). The crime harms
the rest of society by H, with H > R so that it is always socially detrimental. The principal
hires the agent after having observed the realization of R; he has full bargaining power and
makes a take-it or leave-it o⁄er, which entails a wage w paid by the principal to the agent
after the crime is committed but before the investigation takes place. For simplicity, we
normalize the agent￿ s outside option to zero.
Prosecution: Committing the crime triggers an investigation, which opens with probability
￿. We assume that two types of public o¢ cials may be in charge of the judicial and
investigative process. Building on the historical evidence discussed in Section 2, we assume
that there are honest o¢ cials, which do not have links with the criminal group and thus
always seek to convict the mobsters under investigation, and dishonest o¢ cials, which are
instead ready to acquit the defendants whenever possible. There is an overall measure 1
of o¢ cials in the economy, a fraction ￿ of which is honest. The o¢ cial￿ s type is observed
only by the principal but not by the agent, who is unaware of the hidden links between the
former and law enforcers.17
Dishonest types can be either interpreted as those individuals who are strongly linked to
the criminal organization for cultural and personal reasons ￿Vito Ciancimino, for instance,
was born in Corleone and already in the youth used to be close friend with Riina and
Provenzano ￿or those individuals that are willing to accommodate criminals because they
fear their intimidation power. In both cases, the parameter ￿ re￿ ects an inverse measure
of the in￿ uence of the organization into the public domain and will be a key comparative
statics parameter. Ma￿a associations frequently tried to manipulate court decisions by
bribing, threatening, and, occasionally, even murdering judges and prosecutors. Tommaso
Buscetta was the ￿rst to expose in detail the secret exchanges that linked politicians to the
Sicilian ma￿a. On November 1992, he testi￿ed in front of the Antima￿a Commission about
the links between Cosa Nostra and Salvo Lima, indicating Lima as the politician to whom
16In our setting, public o¢ cials can be either prosecutors, heading the prosecution phase, or members of
the police force, whose investigative e⁄ort heavily in￿ uence the probability of convicting a defendant.
17The available historical evidence o⁄ers ample support for this hypothesis. For instance, security concerns
have led to the creation in the ￿ Ndrangheta of a secret society within the secret society: La Santa. Membership
in the Santa is only known to its members. Bosses belonging to the Santa have precisely the objective of
establishing close connections with state representatives, and simple soldiers are unaware of these connections.
Assuming that the o¢ cial￿ s type is observed by both the principal and the agent would not add new key
insights to our analysis, however. In that case, the agent￿ s reporting strategy would depend on the o¢ cial￿ s
type (only when the o¢ cial is honest would the agent possibly report evidence against the boss) but the
basic insight would be similar: a more lenient policy makes agents facing honest o¢ cials more willing to
cooperate.
￿13 ￿Cosa Nostra turned most often to resolve problems for the organization whose solution lay
in Rome.18 Bruno Contrada, a former head of the Italian Intelligence Agency, was sentenced
to ten years for collusion with Cosa Nostra. He was accused of informing the Sicilian ma￿a
on upcoming police operations, preventing in particular an early capture of the fugitive Tot￿
Riina.19 For simplicity, here we do not explicitly model the corruption and the intimidation
process that generates the o¢ cial￿ s types.20
Legal regimes: There are two legal regimes, with and without leniency:
￿ No leniency: if the public o¢ cial is honest, the agent is convicted with probability p
and bears a sanction Sa, whereas the principal is convicted with probability ￿ 6 p and
bears the sanction Sp; this assumption simply re￿ ects the idea that convicting the boss
(i.e., the crime instigator) in the absence of testimonies is less likely than convicting
the agent who has materially committed the crime. Otherwise, both mobsters are
acquitted.
￿ Leniency: when the investigation starts, the agent can opt to cooperate with the
justice, by testifying against his boss. The prize for this cooperation is a reduction
by ￿ of the sanction Sa. If the agent cooperates, the boss bears the sanction Sp
with probability ￿ > ￿, irrespective of the o¢ cial￿ s type.21 In practice, there can be
no conviction solely on the basis of what is attested by an accomplice witness, there
must be evidence from an unrelated source to corroborate the witness￿ s testimony; we
therefore interpret ￿ as a measure of the reliability of the informant.22 Finally, for the
historical reasons explained in Section 2, we rule out the possibility that the boss talks
as well as the possibility that the agent decides to cooperate before an investigation
is opened.
18Buscetta also claimed that Lima was killed on March 1992 because he had outlived his usefulness. On
January 1992 an appeal court had upheld the convictions of dozens of mobsters after a team of anti-ma￿a
judges had taken control of the case. Lima had originally wished to appoint a judge of his own choice,
instead, Giovanni Falcone had taken charge of the appeal and con￿rmed the sentences of many mobsters.
Lima was therefore of no further use to the Ma￿a.
19￿Audizione del collaboratore di giustizia Gaspare Mutolo￿ , Antima￿a Commission, February 9, 1993.
20In an earlier version of the paper we have formally developed a ￿ bribing￿stage to generate the fraction
of dishonest o¢ cials. In both, the current and that previous version, the main characterization results and
the comparative statics are qualitatively the same.
21We assume that a dishonest o¢ cial can no longer manipulate the trial when the agent cooperates. This
is consistent with the evidence discussed in Section 2.
22This parameter might measure the status of the informant into the organization or its proximity to the
leader: mobsters at a higher level in the hierarchy constitute a better source of information than simple
￿ soldiers￿who typically execute orders blindly.
￿14 ￿Trial-reluctance, cohesion and retaliation: In order to model con￿ ict within the or-
ganization in the simplest possible way, we assume that if an investigation is launched,
the agent discovers his reluctance (￿) to face the trial. This parameter is drawn from the
compact support [￿;￿], according to the atomless and twice continuously di⁄erentiable cu-
mulative distribution function G(￿). There are various interpretations for this parameter.
Di⁄erences in ￿ could be either due to psychological costs resulting from the fear and appre-
hension of imprisonment, which materialize only when the agent is about to face the trial;23
or, they might re￿ ect those emotional costs the mobster incurs in when he realizes that the
trial will publicly attach to their relatives the ￿ Ma￿a stigmata￿ .24 As observed by judge
Falcone in one of his last interviews (1991), the willingness to cooperate may also re￿ ect
an unanticipated low degree of trust and cohesion inside the organization. For example,
internal ￿ghts between formerly allied clans and partners (see Gambetta, 1992, pg. 162)
might encourage the losers to have their revenge by cooperating with the justice rather than
facing the trial and then eventually seek the ￿ght on the military ground.25
We also assume that criminal organizations seek to punish whistle-blowers, a feature
that we model with a retaliation loss L su⁄ered by the informant. The ability of a witness
to give testimony in a judicial setting or to cooperate with law enforcement investigations
without fear of intimidation or reprisals is essential. Increasingly, countries are enacting
legislation or adopting policies to protect witnesses whose cooperation with law enforcement
authorities or testimony in a court of law would endanger their lives or those of their families.
Accordingly, we shall interpret a lower value of the loss L as the result of better witness
protection programs.
Timing: We follow the literature in assuming that the Legislator moves ￿rst.26 The precise
23In ma￿a trials the imprisonment of defendants is often mandatory even before the de￿nitive verdict for
precautionary reasons. And the trial can be very long depending on the importance of the charges and the
number of defendants (the Spartacus Maxi Trial, for example, lasted ten years).
24According to judge Lia Sava, many informants decide to talk for the sake of their chil-
dren well being: for instance, Giusy Vitale and Carmela Iuculano decided to talk mainly be-
cause they did not want their sons to experience the same destiny (imprisonment or even prema-
ture death) of their brothers and fathers (Narcoma￿e, dossier n. 10, October, 2005 ￿ available at
http://www.narcoma￿e.it/articoli_2005/dos_10_2005.htm). Similarly, when asked about the motivations
behind his cooperation, Calogero Ganci, one of Falcone￿ s and Dalla Chiesa￿ s killers, testi￿ed ￿...I will talk in
order to guarantee a better future to my children...￿(Lodato, 2006, pg. 402). Relatives of publicly known
Ma￿a members are also often subject to discrimination on the labor market. For instance, in an interview
with an Italian newspaper, the daughter of the boss Tot￿ Riina complained of being often discriminated at
the job application stage simply because of her last name (Repubblica, 28 January, 2009).
25The testimonies of Buscetta and Contorno against the Corleonesi were an example of the revenge role
played by the leniency program. However, this was not always the case, the informants Francesco Mannoia
and Calogero Gancia were both former members of the winning Corleonesi family.
26See e.g. Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Rey (2003).
￿15 ￿sequence of events unfolds as follows:
t=0 The Legislator decides whether to launch a leniency program and accordingly commits
to an amnesty rate ￿.
t=1 Uncertainty about R resolves and the organization decides whether to commit the
crime; if it chooses not to commit the crime, the game ends, otherwise the principal
pays the wage w to the agent once the crime is committed and the game then proceeds
to the next stage.
t=2 With probability ￿ an investigation opens. The public o¢ cial in charge of the case
is honest with probability ￿ and dishonest with probability 1 ￿ ￿. The type of the
public o¢ cial is not observed by the agent.
t=3 The agent learns his personal costs of facing the trial, ￿, and, if a leniency program
is in place, decides whether to cooperate with the justice.27 Depending on the legal
regime, the trial uncertainty resolves, and sanctions (including the retaliation loss) are
imposed.
In the Appendix we provide a detailed illustration of the game tree.
Actions and equilibrium concept: An action pro￿le for the principal involves a wage
o⁄er w. An action pro￿le for the agent involves a participation rule, which depends on
the di⁄erence between the wage and his expected sanction, and a confession decision, i.e.,
whether to cooperate or not, which will depend on his type ￿. The Legislator simply
announces ￿. We shall look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this game.
Technical assumptions: The analysis will be conducted under the following simplifying
conditions:
A1 Monotone and (strictly) increasing hazard-rate:










As shown in the Appendix, A1 ensures that the Legislator￿ s program is single peaked.
It is adopted in many economic applications and satis￿ed by usual standard distributions.28
27As explained above, assuming that the agent discovers his type ￿ only when the investigation starts ￿ts
the available evidence. However, our results would not change in case this uncertainty realizes ex ante and
the principal cannot use very complex revelation mechanisms that condition the wage on the behavioral type.






This condition rules out the uninteresting case where no agent ever talks in equilibrium.
It can be easily satis￿ed by standard distribution functions.
Finally, following the literature, all sanctions will be interpreted as the monetary equiv-
alent of the imprisonment terms, ￿nes, damages, and so forth, to which the criminals expose
themselves. This assumption is made only for the sake of simplicity. Our insights readily
extend to non-monetary sanctions as long as their cost is not excessively large, in which
case granting a positive discount is still optimal.29
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
We now characterize the equilibrium of the game. We shall ￿rst characterize the no leniency
case and then turn to the more interesting case where the Legislator considers granting
amnesties to informants.
3.1.1 No leniency
We consider ￿rst the subgame with no leniency. If an investigation opens, the agent must
face the trial. The principal￿ s expected gain is then:
u = R ￿ w ￿ ￿￿￿Sp;
where w is the expected wage paid by the principal; this expected wage will be set so as to
compensate the agent for his participation into the criminal business:






represents the expected cost that the agent bears from the trial, while p￿Sa is the agent￿ s
expected sanction.30
29See Garoupa (1997) for an overview on optimal law enforcement with non-monetary sanctions.
30Our qualitative insights remain unchanged if we assume that, instead of capturing an aversion to the
trial, the parameter ￿ measures an unanticipated cost associated to the enforcement of the sanction, such as
the psychological cost of the conviction. In this case E[￿] simply needs to be weighted by the probability of
being convicted, p￿.
￿17 ￿The principal will decide to go on with the crime if and only if the return R is larger
than the expected costs, that is:
R > ￿(￿ (pSa + ￿Sp) + E[￿]) ￿ b Rn:
The crime becomes less pro￿table, the higher is the probability that an investigation is
opened (￿ large), the more severe and e¢ cient is the prosecution system (p, Sa and Sp large),
the larger is the fraction of honest o¢ cials (￿ large) and the higher is the agent￿ s expected
cost from the trial or the lower is the cohesion between the members of the organization
(E[￿] large). In the absence of leniency, the economy crime rate is thus given by:
rn = Pr(R > b Rn) = 1 ￿ F(b Rn):
We shall see below how the possibility of launching a leniency program a⁄ects this rate.
3.1.2 Leniency and the optimal policy
In this section we derive the optimal leniency policy. The analysis has two main objectives.
First, we characterize the optimal amnesty rate. Second, we wish to understand the com-
parative statics with respect to the main underlying parameters. The game can be solved
with a simple backward-induction logic. Once an investigation is launched, not cooperating
exposes the agent to the cost of the trial, ￿, and to an expected sanction, p￿Sa; in contrast,
cooperating reduces the sanction to (1 ￿ ￿)Sa, but exposes the agent to a retaliation loss,
L. The agent￿ s payo⁄ are thus:
u =
(
￿(1 ￿ ￿)Sa ￿ L if he cooperates
￿p￿Sa ￿ ￿ if does not,
(2)
he will therefore cooperate as long as his type ￿ is larger than a threshold b ￿ (￿) equal to:
b ￿ (￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p)Sa + L: (3)
The expression of the threshold shows that the agent is more keen to talk the more
generous the amnesty ￿ is, the higher the proportion of honest o¢ cials in the economy is,
and the more e¢ cient the prosecution stage is. It is interesting to observe that the e¢ cacy of
a leniency program strengthens if this is complemented with an e¢ cient witness protection
program. In our setting the parameter L will measure the e⁄ectiveness of such protection
program: an accomplice who feels well protected (low L) is more inclined to cooperate with
the justice.
Assuming that b ￿ (￿) lies in the interior of the support [￿;￿] ￿a condition that will be
checked in the Appendix ￿the agent￿ s participation constraint can be written as:
u(w) = w ￿ ￿
"Z ￿
b ￿(￿)






￿18 ￿Clearly, this constraint will be binding, so that the equilibrium wage w(￿) makes the











Equipped with this characterization, we can now turn to de￿ne the principal￿ s expected
utility from committing the crime, we have:
v (R) = R ￿ w(￿) ￿ C (￿);













The Legislator sets the amnesty rate ￿ so as to maximize social welfare. Using the fact





(R ￿ H)dF (R); (4)
which amounts to maximize the principal￿ s expected costs, i.e., the sum of the wage w(￿)
and the expected loss C (￿):
L : max
￿2R+









(￿ (pSa + ￿Sp) + ￿)dG(￿):
The next proposition describes the solution of L and characterizes the optimal amnesty
rate. Let h(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ G(￿))=g (￿), we have:
Proposition 1 Assume A1 and A2, then there exists a unique interior optimal amnesty
rate ￿￿ which maximizes the Legislator￿ s program L and that solves the following necessary
and su¢ cient ￿rst-order condition:





The ￿rst-order condition (5) has a simple economic interpretation. The optimal amnesty
￿￿ must balance (at the margin) the social gains and the social costs associated with the
introduction of the accomplice-witnesses program. On the one hand, increasing the amnesty
￿ reduces the agent￿ s expected sanction, whereby making entry into the organization less
costly for the principal. On the other hand, a higher amnesty makes the agent more willing
￿19 ￿to cooperate by lowering the threshold b ￿ (￿), this increases the probability of convicting the
principal, whereby sti￿ ing his incentive to commit the crime.
While the latter e⁄ect brings out the bright side of a leniency program, the former one
underscores its dark side.
The next corollary shows how the optimal policy characterized above a⁄ects both the
prosecution and the crime rates.
Corollary 2 Under A1 and A3, the optimal policy ￿￿ shifts upward the boss￿ s prosecution
risk from ￿ to ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ G(b ￿ (￿￿))) and sti￿es the crime rate relative to the regime
with no leniency, that is, b Rl (￿￿) > b Rn.
The optimal policy shifts the informant￿ s testimony onto the boss￿prosecution risk. In
fact, while ￿ can be interpreted as the rate of the boss￿ s prosecution in the absence of
leniency, the additional term (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ G(b ￿ (￿￿))) re￿ ects the variation of such a rate as
implied by the in￿ ow of new information provided by the mass 1￿G(b ￿ (￿￿)) of informants.
To explain why the leniency program also deters crime, note that a too low amnesty
would replicate the same outcome as in the absence of leniency: in this case, even the
more trial-averse agent (i.e., type ￿) would prefer not to cooperate. In short, b ￿ (￿￿) must
not exceed ￿. Indeed, since the Legislator￿ s objective function is concave in ￿ and has a
maximum at ￿￿ (which under A2 exceeds ￿), it is suboptimal to induce no cooperation at
all. On the other hand, note that the Legislator never wants to grant an amnesty rate so
high that all agents cooperate. Indeed, such an amnesty rate would lower the principal￿ s
expected costs and spur the crime rate: the optimal policy cannot induce b ￿ (￿￿) to fall short
of ￿.
Given that the relative strength of the bright and dark side of the leniency program,
as exempli￿ed by (5), depends on the underlying parameters of the model, in the next
proposition we summarize the comparative statics of the optimal policy:
Proposition 3 The optimal amnesty ￿￿ satis￿es the following properties:
￿ it increases with respect to the quality of the evidence provided by the informant ￿, the
principal￿ s sanction Sp and the retaliation loss L;
￿ it decreases with respect to the fraction of honest o¢ cials ￿ and the e¢ ciency of the
prosecution system, ￿ and p;
￿ it increases with respect to the agent￿ s sanction Sa as long as the optimal amnesty rate
￿￿ is lower than the probability of being acquitted if the agent decides to face the trial,
1 ￿ ￿p; the converse holds otherwise.
￿20 ￿A more intense amnesty is needed, the more reliable is the evidence provided by the
informant and the more harshly the legal system punishes the boss of the criminal organi-
zation. This is because both these parameters spur the principal￿ s conviction risk, whereby
making the crime less pro￿table. The same conclusion holds with regard to the retaliation
loss L: if the organization can punish the whistle-blower more harshly, or if the witnesses
protection program is not very e⁄ective, a more generous amnesty is needed for the agent
to ￿nd cooperating convenient. There is, however, less need for a generous amnesty when
the fraction of honest o¢ cials in the economy gets larger, and if the prosecution system be-
comes more e¢ cient. Intuitively, an increase in any of these parameters makes the crime less
convenient even in the absence of a leniency program, whereby calling for lower discounts.
The impact of the agent￿ s sanction Sa on the optimal amnesty is ambiguous: it depends
only on the e⁄ect that harsher sanctions produce on the agent￿ s propensity to talk, that
is, on the equilibrium threshold b ￿ (￿￿). Essentially, if the optimal amnesty ￿￿ is lower than
the probability of being acquitted if the agent decides to face the trial 1 ￿ ￿p, the fraction
of informants decreases (b ￿ (￿￿) increases), therefore the Legislator is forced to increase the
amnesty rate in order to counterbalance the positive e⁄ect that a higher Sa has on the
principal￿ s pro￿ts via fewer informants. Otherwise, the opposite result obtains.
These insights also explain the following comparative statics about the fraction of ￿ ipping
agents:
Proposition 4 The fraction of agents who talk at the equilibrium satis￿es the following
properties:
￿ it increases with respect to the quality of the evidence provided by the informant ￿ and
the principal￿ s sanction Sp;
￿ it decreases with respect to the fraction of honest o¢ cials ￿ and the e¢ ciency of
prosecution system vis-￿-vis the boss, ￿.
As discussed in Section 2, the anti-Ma￿a programs not only o⁄er leniency to informants,
but often also secure them stable wages, health insurance, housing and other ￿nancial
supports. It is therefore interesting to see when it is optimal to grant rewards (that is,
￿￿ > 1). To address this question, we will assume here that the parameter ￿ is uniformly









, there is a positive fraction of ￿talkers￿
at equilibrium; the ￿rst-order condition (5) yields:










￿21 ￿A simple inspection of this condition yields:




, then it is optimal to o⁄er a
reward (i.e., ￿￿ > 1) whenever:





Thus, if the retaliation loss L is excessively large, the optimal leniency program must
reward accomplices. Since the lower-bound L is increasing in ￿, this is more likely to be
necessary when the informant￿ s testimony is highly reliable (￿ large), as exempli￿ed by the
case of Tommaso Buscetta, the ￿rst important pentito, who was allowed to live in the USA
under a new identity in the Witness Protection Program after his testimony in the ￿ New
York Pizza Connection Trial￿in the mid-1980s.31 Moreover, as L is also decreasing in ￿, the
optimal policy must feature rewards also when the criminal organization exhibits a strong
internal cohesion (￿ low); this is, for instance, the case of organizations such as the Calabrian
￿ Ndrangheta, whose members are mainly linked by blood relationships.
4 Evidence
In order to provide further empirical support to our theoretical predictions, in this section we
exploit a panel data set relative to the 95 administrative provinces and 26 judicial districts
which characterized Italy during the 1990s. The data rely on important aspects of organized
crime in Italy as well as on some features of the leniency and accomplice-protection program
introduced by the Italian Legislator in 1991.32 The program grants lower sanctions, as well
as protection, to those accomplices of ma￿a associations who provide information that might
turn useful for prosecuting their former clans, and, more generally, for shedding new light
on their internal organization and external complicities.33
The main objective here is to argue that the available evidence points in the direction
of our analysis. More precisely, besides predicting a negative correlation between leniency
and ma￿a crimes, as reported in Section 2, our model delivers two additional testable
implications about: the direct impact of leniency on the rate of prosecution of criminal
31Rewards are nowadays also granted to former members of the Japanese Yakuza cooperating with prose-
cutors. In exchange of information, the State helps them to ￿nd a job (Corriere della Sera, 2 June, 1992).
32The number of provinces has been recently extended up to 103 since some old provinces have been split.
See Appendix 2 for details on data.
33It is important to stress that laws relative to the leniency program are nationwide and, as such, cannot
induce any di⁄erential implementation across provinces or ma￿a associations.
￿22 ￿organizations; and the determinants of the criminals￿ propensity to join the protection
program.
(i) As stated in Proposition 1, our analysis implies that, for a given ￿ stock￿of crimes com-
mitted, the introduction of a leniency program granting an amnesty ￿ shifts upward
the prosecution rate from ￿ to ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ G(b ￿ (￿))) ￿the term (1 ￿ G(b ￿ (￿)))
measuring the mass of informants. This observation, together with the fact that, by
law, any new accomplice must provide fresh information to be eligible for the pro-
gram, imply that the rate of prosecution of ma￿a crimes should have increased after
the 1991, thanks to the in￿ ow of the accomplices joining the program.
(ii) The theoretical model also suggests that four variables are mainly relevant for the
decision of former accomplices to cooperate with prosecutors. As shown by equation
(3), for a given level of trial reluctance ￿, the individual is more inclined to talk the
higher the amnesty rate ￿, the higher the probability ￿p to be convicted and the
stronger the e⁄ectiveness of the protection program ￿as re￿ ected by a lower L. In the
following we will mainly provide evidence on the impact of ￿p.
4.1 Did leniency spur prosecution?
Two distinct articles of the Italian penal code deal with criminal organizations: art. 416
refers to the crime of ￿ criminal association￿ , while art. 416-bis refers to the crime of ￿ ma￿a-
type association￿ . These articles regulate di⁄erent types of crimes, but share some common
features. For instance, associations of at least three people may be prosecuted both as
criminal or as ma￿a-type associations. Moreover, both criminal and ma￿a-type associations
are generally involved in the same kind of illicit activities. Nevertheless, the peculiarity of
ma￿a-type associations, as stated by the third clause of art. 416-bis, is the exploitation
of the force of intimidation, the condition of silence (omert￿) which derives from it and
the perverse relationships that they have with public o¢ cials. For our purpose, the key
di⁄erence is that the Italian legislator allowed the possibility to enjoy lighter sentences in
exchange of valuable information only to ma￿a a¢ liates (art. 8 D.L. 13/05/1991 n.152).
Prosecutions for both crimes are recorded according to the year in which the judicial
authority begins the penal action and the province in which the crime has been committed.
The time period begins in 1993 and lasts until 2005 since data before 1993 have not been
collected by the Italian Statistical O¢ ce (ISTAT).
As expected, the provinces located in Sicily, Calabria and Campania exhibit the largest
shares of prosecutions for the ma￿a association crime ￿see Table 3 which shows the top-5
provinces with most prosecutions for both crimes. The prosecutions for criminal association,
￿23 ￿instead, feature a higher degree of dispersion across the country (note that Milan is in the
north and Rome in the center of Italy). Naples and Palermo are the provinces with the
highest numbers of prosecutions for ma￿a; incidentally, Naples is also the province featuring
the greatest number of prosecutions for generic criminal association.
Table 3: Top-5 provinces with most prosecutions
Ma￿a-type association (art. 416-bis) Criminal association (art. 416)
Provinces Prosecutions Provinces Prosecutions
Caltanisetta (Sicily) 255 Bari (Puglia) 382
Catanzaro (Calabria) 262 Palermo (Sicily) 422
Catania (Sicily) 286 Milano (Lombardia) 720
Napoli (Campania) 401 Roma (Lazio) 1125
Palermo (Sicily) 476 Napoli (Campania) 1306
Note: The table reports the total number of crimes prosecuted during
1993-2005, relative to artt. 416 and 416-bis of the Italian penal code.
In Italy prosecutions can be triggered either by the policy forces34 or by prosecutors
themselves. Therefore, the total number of prosecuted crimes must re￿ ect the sum of the
subset of crimes reported to the judicial authority by the police forces which result in a pros-
ecution, and those crimes brought into the spotlight by prosecutors themselves. Actually, for
any crime reported by the investigation forces, the judicial authority may eventually prose-
cute more than one crime, possibly because the investigation and prosecution process may
generate fresh information about other crimes. As a result, both the level and the evolution
of the ratio between total crimes prosecuted and those reported by the police forces, appear
as good proxies for identifying the impact of the testimonies of ￿ ￿ ipping￿criminals on the
rate of prosecution. This is because the information provided by the accomplices o¢ cially
participating to the protection program is handled exclusively by the judicial authority and
not by the police forces. Hence:
￿ Empirical prediction 1: The introduction of the leniency program should generate
an increment in the ratio of crimes prosecuted by the judicial authority to the number
of crimes reported by the police forces.
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the ratios between the crimes prosecuted and those
reported by the police forces in Italy from 1988 to 2005, for both ma￿a-type and other
criminal organizations.35 A ￿rst important point to emphasize is that in 1988 the ratio
34Namely, the Carabinieri, the Police and the Customs Police.
35Note that each prosecution must last at most one year, after which either the trial begins, provided that
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related to ma￿a associations, labelled as Ma￿as, was well below that related to other criminal
groups ￿Others. The former, however, registered a discrete shift upward in 1992, thus
reaching the latter, and then did increase up to values around 2; di⁄erently, for the period
of interest the ratio related to other criminal groups ￿ uctuated around 1.
A more formal evidence of the peculiar pattern of prosecutions for ma￿a associations
since 1993 can be provided by estimating the following equation:
PROSECUTION i;t = ai + cTi;t + "i;t;
where PROSECUTION i;t is the prosecution ratio relative to Ma￿as or Others in province
i and year t, ai is the province ￿xed e⁄ect, Ti;t is a deterministic trend, and "i;t is an
error term. OLS estimates are reported in Table 4. The column labelled ￿Core-regions￿
refers to a restricted sample, which contains only the provinces belonging to Campania,
Puglia, Calabria and Sicily. Instead, the column labelled ￿Rest of Italy￿ is relative to
the other Italian provinces. The positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient for the trend clari￿es
that prosecutions relative to ma￿a association strongly increased after the introduction of
leniency within the core-regions, i.e., those in which ma￿a type organizations have been
historically more pervasive. A positive trend also emerges if we look at prosecutions related
to criminal groups di⁄erent from the ma￿a ones. However, the point estimate of c is now
about one fourth of the corresponding coe¢ cient for ma￿a-type associations. Di⁄erently, for
there is enough evidence, or the case is closed. Therefore, we construct our ratio by using the average value
of crimes reported to the judicial authority by the police forces in two adjacent years as the denominator.
Results do not change however if we use only the contemporaneous value.
￿25 ￿the rest of Italy the path of the prosecution ratio does not feature a statistically signi￿cant
trend.36
Table 4: Crimes Prosecuted after Leniency
Ma￿a-type associations: art. 416-bis Criminal associations: art. 416
Italy Core-regions Rest of Italy Italy Core-regions Rest of Italy
Trend 0.053* 0.116*** -0.019 0.015 0.029* 0.011
(2.05) (3.62) (-0.52) (1.23) (2.15) (0.69)
N 620 281 339 1212 286 926
Note: Dependent variable is the number of crimes prosecuted expressed as ratio with
respect to the number of crimes accusated by the police forces. For any t, the latter is
the average of current and lagged accusations. Provincial dummies (not reported) are
allowed. Time span: 1993-2005. Standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and
intraprovince serial correlation (t-values are in parentheses). Signi￿cant coe¢ cients
are indicated by * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.
Further evidence available only for Italy as a whole, might help clarifying that the
peculiar pattern of prosecutions for ma￿a associations should not be driven by the time
variation in the output of the judicial authority. Interestingly, an index of the prosecutors￿
activity against ma￿a crimes suggests a decrease rather than an increase in the total output
during the last ￿fteen years. Figure 3 displays the evolution of the ratio between the number
of procedures completed in a given year ￿ that is, those cases which are ￿led or end up
with prosecutions ￿ and the sum of total procedures pending at the beginning of the year
and those starting during the year. The index changed from 0.46 in 1997 (when the data
becomes to be available) to 0.38 in 2007, whereas during the same period the number of
new procedures was mainly constant.37 At the same time, it is interesting to point out
that, during 2000-07, the number of people that prosecutors asked for prosecutions for
ma￿a crimes as a share of the total number of people formally investigated by the judicial
authority ￿variable Share in Figure 3 ￿increased from 0.31 up to 0.47.
In short, this suggests that although the rate at which prosecutors handle cases has not
increased in the period under consideration, the ￿nal outcome of the investigation activity
36Note that ma￿a association crime prosecutions within Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicily are signi￿-
cantly positively correlated with, respectively, the total number of former a¢ liates to Camorra, Sacra Corona
Unita, ￿ Ndrangheta and Ma￿a who bene￿t from the protection program. Such correlation instead does not
hold when prosecutions refer to other criminal associations. Unfortunately, detailed data on accomplices
during the 1990s are not available.
37The index is relative to the set of ma￿a crimes as indicated by the ￿ Codice di Procedura Penale￿ , art. 51.
comma 3 bis.
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has featured an increase in the share of people prosecuted ￿a pattern which is strongly
consistent with the evidence produced in Figure 2 and Table 4.
Taken together, the previous ￿ndings strongly suggest that after the introduction of the
leniency policy more and more ma￿a crime cases were opened by prosecutors themselves
thanks to the information provided by previous accomplices: a signi￿cant impulse to the
prosecution activity against ma￿a association crimes was provided by the larger and more
reliable information managed by the judicial authority thanks to the informants￿testimonies.
Thus, like in antitrust cases (Rey, 2003, and Miller 2009, among others), in addition to
investigation activities, the design of leniency programs is an important tool also in ￿ghting
organized crime.
4.2 On the determinants to talk
We now provide some evidence about the determinants of the agents￿incentive to talk. The
starting point of the regression result is the de￿nition of the ￿ indi⁄erence￿threshold b ￿ (￿) as
expressed by equation (3), which re￿ ects the link between the number of accomplices and
the underlying parameters of the theoretical model.38 Actually, during the period in which
data are available, the Italian Legislator did not modify the amnesty rate ￿, thus its e⁄ect
on b ￿ is not empirically identi￿able. Instead, we are able to assess the impact of the e¢ ciency
of the judicial system, as measured by ￿p, on the in￿ ow of accomplices. Hence:
38As already discussed above, since we cannot be sure that the amnesty rate set by the Italian Legislator
is the optimal one, we shall conduct our analysis by taking ￿ as given, i.e., we shall not evaluate equation
(3) at ￿
￿ as determined in Proposition 1.
￿27 ￿￿ Empirical prediction 2: The higher is the ￿ perceived￿ probability to be acquitted
1 ￿ ￿p, the lower is the number of ￿ipping criminals.
Starting from 2000, yearly information about the number of ma￿a accomplices entering
the protection program is available. In particular, the data allow to associate each accom-
plice to his former ma￿a group ￿labelled as Camorra, ￿ Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita,
Ma￿a, or Others ￿ as well as to the judicial district where he was prosecuted. This de￿nes
the number of talkers. Moreover, we use the share of people acquitted in ma￿a trials to
proxy for 1 ￿ ￿p. The variation in such a share is exploited to determine the e⁄ects of the
perceived probability of being convicted on the number of former accomplices who become
talkers. The basic regression to deal with the empirical prediction is the following:
TALKERSi;t = a0 + a1ACQUITTANCEi;t + a2;tDTt + "i;t (8)
where TALKERSi;t is the number of former accomplices prosecuted in the judicial district
i and entering the protection program in year t, ACQUITTANCEi;t is the share of people
involved in ma￿a trials who end up to be acquitted ￿ that is people acquitted over the sum
of people acquitted and convicted ￿ and t = 2000;:::;2007. We introduce year dummies
DTt to control for nation-wide shocks. Under the assumption that ACQUITTANCEi;t is
uncorrelated with "i;t, the coe¢ cient a1 identi￿es the e⁄ect of 1 ￿ ￿p on the number of
￿ ipping criminals, thus we expect a1 < 0.
Although we indeed believe that the propensity to become an informant is a⁄ected by the
accomplice￿ s perceived probability to be convicted, we cannot neglect that TALKERS and
ACQUITTANCE might be correlated because the cross-sectional variability of the former,
which is partly due to historical di⁄erences among ma￿a groups, a⁄ects that of the latter.
As noticed above, for instance, during the 1990s a¢ liates to the ￿ Ndrangheta had a very
low propensity to collaborate with prosecutors when compared to the Ma￿a and Camorra
accomplices. Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that
"i;t = vi + ￿i;t
where vi is a district-speci￿c time-invariant component correlated with ACQUITTANCEi;t.
We address such problem through the inclusion of district dummies among the regressors
of equation (8) or by taking the ￿rst-di⁄erences of the variables of interest. By allowing
for district dummies we control for ma￿a-speci￿c ￿xed factors, so that only within-district
variability in talkers contribute to the estimation of the acquittance￿ s e⁄ect. A similar
argument applies when ￿rst-di⁄erences are considered. Hence, the two approaches should
address the most likely endogeneity concern.
Table 5 reports the main results relative to all judicial districts characterized by at least
1 crime per year on average for ACCUSATION (that is, a total value during the period
￿28 ￿greater than 8) and to the subset of 10 districts strongly troubled by the four main ma￿a
groups. The ￿rst two columns rely on district dummies while the third and fourth columns
refer to the ￿rst-di⁄erence speci￿cation. As shown the coe¢ cient a1 is always estimated to be
negative although not statistically signi￿cant (5% level) when the total sample is considered.
Point estimates relative to the restricted sample are very similar between speci￿cations.
Table 5: Incentives to become talkers
Levels speci￿cation First-di⁄erence speci￿cation
ACQUITTANCE -1.72 -11.31* -2.80 -10.80**
(-1.23) (-2.54) (-1.68) (-3.10)
Obs. (Districts) 133 (17) 80 (10) 115 (17) 70 (10)
Note: Dependent variable is the number of former ma￿a accomplices who be-
come informants. Results reported in the ￿rst two columns are based on vari-
ables in levels allowing for judicial districts as well as calendar year dummies.
Results reported in the last two columns are based instead on ￿rst-di⁄erence
variables. The t-values are in parentheses (standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity); signi￿cant coe¢ cients are indicated by * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
and *** p<0.001.
Although allowing for ￿xed e⁄ects eliminates a potential channel of endogeneity, previ-
ous estimates may still be biased. If the information provided by the informants at time
t not only a⁄ect the prosecution rate, as argued in the previous section, but also the out-
comes of future trials in t+s, then it is more appropriate to assume feedbacks from current
TALKERS to future ACQUITTANCE. In this circumstance, both the dummy variables and
￿rst-di⁄erence approaches might deliver inconsistent estimates. In particular, ￿rst-di⁄erence
estimates would be consistent if vi;t is (eventually) correlated with ACQUITTANCEi;t+s
for s > 1. Conversely, if talkers in t a⁄ected the sentences of trials in t + 1 ￿a possibil-
ity that by the way we cannot rule out ￿then ￿vi;t would be positively correlated with
￿ACQUITTANCEi;t thus implying a toward to zero bias of the OLS estimate. In this case,
however, a suitable instrumental variable for ￿ACQUITTANCEi;t is ACQUITTANCEi;t￿1.
The results of the ￿rst-stage regression are reported in the ￿rst row of table 6. Clearly,
the lagged level of ACQUITTANCE is strongly correlated with its ￿rst-di⁄erence; the partial
R2 is around 15% and the F-statistics for the exclusion restriction is above 10. The second
row reports results of the second-stage regression. Consistently with previous results a
higher share of people acquitted generates a lower number of talkers. The IV coe¢ cient
is substantially higher in absolute value than the OLS ones (￿29:03 instead of ￿10:80
or ￿11:31), whereby suggesting that previous estimates were indeed biased toward zero.
Finally, we also report the Anderson-Rubin test ￿ the F-statistics and the p-value ￿ for
the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient a1 is statistically not di⁄erent from zero. The test
￿29 ￿is robust to potentially weak instruments. It con￿rms that the estimated coe¢ cient for the
e⁄ect of the probability to be acquitted on the number of talkers is signi￿cant at the 1%
signi￿cance level.
Table 6: Incentives to become talkers: IV regression
First stage coe¢ cient and statistics
ACQUITTANCEi;t￿1 -0.36*** Partial R2 0.15
(-3.36) F-test (p-value) 11.27 (0.001)
Second stage coe¢ cient and statistics
￿ACQUITTANCEi;t -29.03** Anderson_Rubin (H0: a1 = 0) 7.25
-2.68 p-value 0.009
Note: The dependent variable is the ￿rst-di⁄erence of the former ma￿a accomplices who become
informants. The t-values are in parentheses (standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity). The
Anderson-Rubin statistics for the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient on is not signi￿cant corresponds
to the statistics F(1,62). Statistical signi￿cance is indicated by * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and ***
p<0.001.
We close the section discussing some further results. Our main conclusion is robust
to the inclusions of a number of controls. Equation (8) has been also estimated including
the variables MURDER and ACCUSATION, the ratio between the number of ma￿a trials
completed in a given year and the number of trials pending at the beginning of the year,
TRIAL, and the total number of talkers in the protection program at the beginning of the
year. According to the theoretical model, any event which somehow a⁄ects the shape or
the range of the distribution of ￿ implies a shift in the propensity to become informant,
everything else being kept constant. This shift may be a short-lived consequence of ma￿a
wars among di⁄erent factions of the same criminal organization.39 The variable MURDER
should capture such shocks; the role of other controls is straightforward. The IV estimated
ACQUITTANCE coe¢ cient remains statistically signi￿cant and is only slightly altered by
the inclusion of controls; the point estimate is ￿27:70 and the p-value of the Anderson-
Rubin test is 0:015. In the ￿rst stage regression the t-ratio relative to the instrument is
￿3:29.
At least two di⁄erent pieces of evidence are available on the relationship between public
o¢ cials and ma￿a organizations. Overall they imply that the various ma￿as are able to
in￿ uence the public sector activity at local levels and are consistent with the idea that, by
means of their external complicities, criminal organizations may indeed a⁄ect the e¢ ciency
of the judicial system and thus the variation in 1 ￿ ￿p. First,we look at the provincial
distribution of local governments shut down since 1991 because of relationships between
39Note that there is no historical evidence of con￿ icts between the four main ma￿a groups, that is, for
instance, between the Camorra and the ￿ Ndrangheta or the former and the Ma￿a.
￿30 ￿administrators and the ma￿as. Such relationships may substantiate as direct in￿ltrations
of mobsters into the local administrations or through indirect in￿ uence, whereby proxying
the size of the criminal network between ma￿a groups and the public domain. Within the
sample 172 municipalities have been shut down by the central government: 75 in Campania,
49 in Sicily, 38 in Calabria, 7 in Puglia, and only 3 municipalities in the rest of Italy. The
second piece of evidence relies on the number of public o¢ cials convicted for bribing at
regional level, CORRUPTION. Regressing ￿ACQUITTANCE on ￿CORRUPTION lagged
(per capita) it follows a negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient (p-value less than
5%) which is robust to the inclusion of year dummies, the lagged level of ACQUITTANCE
and the above set of controls. Thus, variations in convictions for corruption and ma￿a
crimes tend to be related. Given that, as a ￿nal step of our analysis we have used the
lagged di⁄erence of corruption as a further instrument in the IV regression. The estimate
of a1 without controls is now ￿30:61, very similar to the previous one; the null hypothesis
of the Hansen overidenti￿cation test is not rejected (p-value is 0:78), thus supporting the
validity of the results.
5 Related Literature
Our theoretical analysis is related to the literature on antitrust law enforcement studying
the e⁄ects of leniency programs on cartel formation in oligopolistic markets. The ￿rst paper
explicitly addressing the e⁄ects of leniency programs on cartels is Motta and Polo (2003).
They analyze the impact of reduced ￿nes for cartel members that inform the antitrust
authority and show that it can be e¢ cient to reduce ￿nes even when the authority has
already started an investigation, but has not yet obtained evidence of misbehavior. Besides
other di⁄erences, this paper takes leniency rules as exogenous, while the identi￿cation of
the optimal leniency is a key point in our analysis. Following Rey (2003) and Spagnolo
(2003), we also take into account the role of rewards to former criminals by studying their
determinants and social value.40 Perhaps, the spirit of our paper is closer to Chen and
Rey (2007), which study the optimal design of leniency programs in a standard oligopoly
framework. As Chen and Rey, we also take a mechanism design approach to leniency, but in
a very di⁄erent context. Finally, in a antitrust setting, Aubert et al. (2006), analyze a model
where leniency programs could have a positive social value insofar as they create a con￿ ict
of interests between members of di⁄erent organizations (cartels or ￿rms). They also discuss
informally the idea that leniency programs could be desirable insofar as generate con￿ icts
between the members of the same organizations (e.g., ￿rms). Our model is built precisely
40Contrary to Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) assumes that when a cartel is detected it is also
convicted. This allows to focus on the impact of leniency on cartels which are not already under investigation.
￿31 ￿on this intuition but, in contrast to them, it fully develops the formal arguments, and it
identi￿es the main trade-o⁄s at stake by shedding novel light on the available historical and
empirical evidence.
Another strand of literature our paper relates to is that on organized crime. Tradition-
ally, this literature has stressed welfare comparisons between monopoly and competitive
supply of bads, as for instance in Buchanan (1973) and Backhaus (1979), while more re-
cently Jennings (1984), Polo (1995), Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) and Garoupa (2000)
started to model a criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal has the
necessity to discipline its members.41 However, these models have neglected two relevant as-
pects. First, members at various levels of the criminal chain have di⁄erent bargaining power
and, perhaps more importantly, face di⁄erent prosecution risks and are possibly treated in a
di⁄erent manner by the law. Second, they overlook the role of accomplice-witness programs
as a tool to generate con￿ ict within criminal organizations and their optimal design, which
are key to our analysis.
Our empirical results on the evolutions of prosecution rates and ma￿a murders are
closely related to the evaluation of leniency in cartel enforcement by Miller (2009).42 In
general, the present evidence is fully consistent with Miller￿ s results. However, whereas our
evidence on increased prosecutions is in the same spirit of that on the enhanced detection
capabilities of cartels after leniency, di⁄erently from Miller we also provide some evidence
about deterrence by noting that the unique feature of murders, with respect to many other
crimes, is that measured and e⁄ective amounts are almost the same. This implies that
discovered murders are representative of the entire population and that the usual di¢ culty
of ascertaining deterrence, when the confounding e⁄ect of increased rate of detection also
holds, does not apply.43 Moreover, as a further di⁄erence with Miller, we would like to stress
that our results rely on a panel data set at provincial level. This feature should assure more
robust identi￿cation than that based on a single time-series.
6 Concluding remarks
We have identi￿ed the determinants of accomplice-witnesses programs by underscoring the
bene￿cial role that granting amnesty to informants plays on the crime and prosecution
41See also Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995), Kugler, Verdier and Zenou (2005), Mansour et al. (2006) and
Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008).
42Miller (2009) relies on data generated by the leniency program introduced by the U.S. Department of
Justice in 1993 with the intent of destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels.
43On the deterrence and incapacitation e⁄ects of the criminal justice system see Ehrlich (1973) and Levitt
(1996, 1997 and 1998).
￿32 ￿rates. Our theoretical analysis has shown that the necessity of dealing with former criminals
willing to cooperate with the justice, becomes more intense as long as the prosecution
system is poorly e¢ cient, criminal organizations have strong ties with public o¢ cials and
the information provided by ￿￿ ipping criminals￿ is highly reliable. Consistent with the
available historical evidence, the analysis has also shown that the degree of cohesion between
the members of a criminal organization is key for the design of the optimal leniency policy:
rewards or monetary bene￿ts to informants are indeed sometimes necessary in the presence
of organizations featuring strong cohesion between their members.
The evidence supports the idea that accomplice-witnesses regulations have a positive
e⁄ect on prosecution as well as on deterrence. We have also tested some implications of our
theoretical analysis on the determinants of the criminals￿incentive to cooperate. According
to our model, the estimates show that the in￿ ow of accomplices is negatively correlated with
a proxy of the ine¢ ciency of the judicial system.
Let us conclude with some remarks on the theoretical model and its robustness. Clearly,
to keep it as simple as possible we have made a few simplifying assumptions. For instance,
we considered an exogenous retaliation loss and, relying on the historical evidence, we
also assumed that the agent does not observe the o¢ cial￿ s type. Both these restrictions
can be easily relaxed. As for making the retaliation loss endogenous, one simply needs to
assume that intimidating the agent has a cost, but it might entail future bene￿ts in terms of
reputation: an organization punishing a whistle-blower today might gain since other agents
will talk less likely tomorrow. This issue can be then easily addressed in our framework and,
as it can be readily veri￿ed, neither our theoretical insights nor the empirical predictions
would change. The same conclusion applies if one assumes that the agent is aware of the
o¢ cial￿ s type at the time he chooses whether to cooperate or facing the trial. As already
noted before, in this instance the agent considers talking only in case the o¢ cial is honest,
the logic of the model would not change even in this case. Obviously, there are many other
extensions one could think of. In order to bring the main predictions smoothly to the data,
we did non explore all of them in this paper, we hope to make these further steps in future
research.
￿33 ￿Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1: Di⁄erentiating b Rl (￿) with respect to ￿ and using the fact that
@b ￿ (￿)=@￿ = ￿Sa, we have the ￿rst-order condition:
￿Sa(1￿G(b ￿ (￿)))+Sa
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)Sa + L + ￿Sp
￿
g(b ￿ (￿))￿Sa(￿ (pSa + ￿Sp)+b ￿ (￿))g(b ￿ (￿)) = 0:
Collecting terms and using the de￿nition ofb ￿ (￿), the above equation immediately implies
(5). In order to prove uniqueness we need to show two preliminary results. Speci￿cally, we
must verify that the Legislator cannot gain by setting the amnesty rate neither so large that
all agents will talk, that is b ￿ (￿) 6 ￿; nor so small that no one will talk, that is b ￿ (￿) > ￿.
Suppose ￿rst that ￿ satis￿es b ￿ (￿) = ￿, so that G(b ￿ (￿)) = 0. The sign of the ￿rst-order
derivative of b Rl (￿) with respect to ￿ is determined by:
sign















and under A2 this sign is negative, implying that setting ￿ so large to induce all agents to
talk is not optimal. Consider now the case where b ￿ (￿) = ￿, so that G(b ￿ (￿)) = 1. The sign
of the ￿rst-order derivative of b Rl (￿) with respect to. ￿ is determined by:
sign













implying immediately that setting ￿ so small to induce no agent to talk is also not optimal.
Now, showing that L features a unique interior solution identi￿ed by (5) amounts simply
to verify that b Rl (￿) is single peaked (or strictly quasi-concave): this implies that for all
￿ > ￿￿ the derivative of b Rl (￿) must be negative. Therefore, given the link between the
function b ￿ (:) and ￿ it must be true that:




Spg (￿) < 0 for all ￿ 6 b ￿ (￿￿): (9)




Sp = h(b ￿ (￿￿));and substituting into (9)
we will have uniqueness if:
￿(1 ￿ G(￿)) + h(b ￿ (￿￿))g (￿) < 0 for all ￿ 6 b ￿ (￿￿);
which, in turn, implies h(b ￿ (￿￿)) < h(￿) for all ￿ 6 b ￿ (￿￿), but this inequality is directly
implied by A1 stating that the hazard rate g (￿)=(1 ￿ G(￿)) is strictly increasing in ￿.
Hence the result. ￿
Proof of Corollary 2: Showing that the crime rate always reduces under leniency relative
to the no leniency regime requires a simple revealed preference argument. In fact, the
￿34 ￿Legislator could obtain the same outcome as in the no leniency case by setting a rate such
that b ￿ (￿) > ￿. But, as shown above, this is never optimal under A1 and A2. Finally,
showing that the introduction of the leniency program shifts upward the prosecution rate
from ￿ to ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ G(b ￿ (￿￿))) is immediate: for ￿ > b ￿ (￿￿) agents might talk even
though matched to a dishonest o¢ cial. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: The comparative statics results illustrated in this proposition























which directly implies @￿￿=@￿ > 0.














which, implies @￿￿=@Sp > 0 since ￿ > ￿￿.













which implies @￿￿=@L > 0 since @b ￿ (￿￿)=@L = 1 > 0.




















where by de￿nition of b ￿ (:) it must be @b ￿ (￿￿)=@￿ = ￿pSa < 0. It then follows that
@￿￿=@￿ < 0.


















￿35 ￿which implies @￿￿=@p > 0 since @b ￿ (￿￿)=@p = ￿￿Sa < 0.














which immediately shows that @￿￿=@￿ > 0. Finally, di⁄erentiating with respect to Sa and

















= sign(1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ p￿);
the proof is then concluded. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Let ￿ ￿ b ￿ (￿￿) be the fraction of informants at the equilib-






with h￿1 (:) being increasing by A1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider equation (6), simple algebra allows to show that ￿￿ > 1
if the inequality in (7) holds. ￿
￿36 ￿Appendix 2: Data
Ma￿a (malicious or intentional) murders: number of ma￿a murders reported by the
police forces to the judicial authority. Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Sta-
tistiche giudiziarie penali (several issues).
Malicious or intentional murders: total number of malicious murders, for reasons dif-
ferent than ma￿a, reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT,
Statistiche giudiziarie penali (various issues).
Robberies in banks and post o¢ ces: number of robberies in banks and post o¢ ces
reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie
penali (various issues).
Kidnappings: number of kidnappings excluding those related to extortion reported by the
police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie penali (various
issues).
Prosecution of ma￿a-type association cases: number of cases of ma￿a association
(art. 416-bis of the Italian penal code) prosecuted. Each prosecution is recorded according
to the starting year, that is when the judicial authority begins the penal action. For each
year the spatial distribution re￿ ects the province where the crime prosecuted is presumed
to be committed. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
People prosecuted for ma￿a crimes: total number of people prosecuted because of
ma￿a crimes as indicated by the ￿ Codice di Procedura Penale￿ , art. 51. comma 3 bis.
Source: Italian Department of Justice.
Prosecution of criminal association cases: number of cases of criminal association (art.
416 of the Italian penal code) prosecuted. Each prosecution is recorded according to the
starting year, that is when the judicial authority begins the penal action. For each year
the spatial distribution re￿ ects the province where the crime prosecuted is presumed to be
committed. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
Ma￿a-type association accusation: number of cases of ma￿a association (art. 416-bis
of the Italian penal code) reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source:
ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
Criminal association crime accusation: number of cases of criminal association (art.
416 of the Italian penal code) reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source:
ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
Talkers: number of former ma￿a a¢ liates participating to the Italian accomplice-witnesses
protection program. The dataset associates each accomplice with his former criminal orga-
￿37 ￿nization (labelled as Camorra, ￿ Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita and Ma￿a) and the judicial
district of prosecution. Source: Commissione parlamentare d￿ inchiesta sul fenomeno della
criminalit￿ organizzata ma￿osa o similare, technical report (various issues).
People convicted for ma￿a crimes and people acquitted: the number of people
involved in trials ￿ relative to ma￿a crimes as indicated by the ￿ Codice di Procedura Penale￿ ,
art. 51. comma 3 bis ￿ who end up to be convicted or acquitted. Spatial variability: 26
judicial districts. Source: Italian Department of Justice.
Trials pending and completed: the number of trials pending at the initial year or com-
pleted during the year ￿ relative to ma￿a crimes as indicated by the ￿ Codice di Procedura
Penale￿ , art. 51. comma 3 bis. Spatial variability: 26 judicial districts. Source: Italian
Department of Justice.
Municipality: local governments dismissed by the central government because of ties be-
tween administrators and the Ma￿a either through direct in￿ltrations of mobsters into the lo-
cal administrations or by indirect in￿ uence. Source: Commissione parlamentare d￿ inchiesta
sul fenomeno della criminalit￿ organizzata ma￿osa o similare, technical report (various is-
sues).
Corruption: Public o¢ cials convicted because of bribery. Source: Alto Commissariato per
la Lotta alla Corruzione. Data are relative to Italian regions during 1996-2006. Note that
according to the Italian Penal Code, corruption crimes may be only committed by public
o¢ cials and persons in charge of a public service.
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